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December 2021

## Rail Safety Bulletin



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## Changes to PTS Training

### Message from Network Rail

*Personal Track Safety Initial maximum delegate numbers are to be reduced from 12 to 6 from the 10th January 2022, no exceptions.*

*Network Rail have worked collaboratively with our industry partners, listened to feedback from Providers, Trainers & Network Rail colleagues to address concerns raised regarding the delegate numbers for PTS Initial training.*

*The PTS Initial courses are made up of both classroom learning and a practical track visit which introduces colleagues to a live environment. Reducing delegate numbers will allow additional time for Trainers to fully support new colleagues, reduce risk while waiting for all practical elements and 1:1's.*



*PTS Recertification training numbers will remain at a maximum of 12 delegates.*

# Safety Advice



## Train struck hand trolley

Issued to: **All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and accredited contractors**

Ref: NRA21-14

Date of issue: 16/09/2021

Location: Twickenham Station, Wessex route

Contact: [Obhiye Uduebor](#), Principal H&S Manager, Southern Capital Delivery (Track & Signalling)



## Overview

On Wednesday 8 September 2021, after a possession had been given up, a passenger train struck a hand trolley that had been left on the Up Main line near Twickenham Station.

On collision, the trolley became wedged under the front carriage of the train.

There were no injuries.

The line through Twickenham is an axle counter area and subject to the requirements of Network Rail Work Instruction NR/L3/OPS/084 'Line Clear Arrangements following Engineering Works in Axle Counter Area – Line Clear Verification process'.

An investigation is taking place to understand how the trolley was left on the line.

## Immediate action required

- All COSSs, Safe Work Leaders (SWL) and Engineering Supervisors (ES) must comply with their duties relating to line clear verification (LCV), including complete worksite sweeps, to make sure the line is safe for the passage of trains before handing their worksite back.
- All vehicles, including hand trolleys, placed on the line must be recorded (by the Machine Controller / COSS / SWL / ES / PICOP) on the appropriate LCV forms and cross referenced when each vehicle is removed from the line.

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# Safety Advice



## Dangerous Occurrence: Fall from scaffolding resulting in significant risk of drowning

Issued to: **All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and accredited contractors**

Ref: NRA21-15

Date of issue: 30/09/2021

Location: Glasgow

Contact: [James McKay](#), Health & Safety Manager (Capital Delivery)



## Overview

On Friday 24th September, a scaffolding contractor was tasked with dismantling the tube and fitting scaffold between the south pier and the riverbank on a structure over water in Glasgow.

At approximately 09:15 one of the scaffolders was standing on a dropper tube when it slipped loose from its couplers, causing him to fall from the scaffold into the river along with the tube. His harness and lanyard were clipped on the same dropper tube.

There was a rescue boat on standby and it immediately mobilised, quickly rescuing the scaffolder from the water.

The scaffolder was then taken to hospital by the emergency services. He was discharged around 14:00 on the same day.

Work on the structure has been suspended and an investigation is underway.

## Immediate action required

- Always wear a harness when working at height, and know where your suitable anchor points are, unless other protection is in place.
- Ensure documented erection and dismantling procedures are in place and communicated.
- Ensure the control measures are being implemented and followed.
- Ensure life jackets are worn during all scaffold erection, dismantle and alteration works above watercourses.
- Ensure personal fall protection equipment (e.g. harness, lanyard, inertia reel, etc.) is relevant to the task, frequently inspected and maintained, and suitable anchorage points are utilised.

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# Safety Advice



## Trolley strike at Challow

Issued to: **All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and accredited contractors**

Ref: NRA21-16

Date of issue: 28/10/2021

Location: National

Contact: [Louise Evatt](#)



## Overview

At 06:10 on 21st October, a GWR Intercity Express train service struck a half link trolley on the Down Main at Challow (83m MLN) between Didcot and Swindon at around 100mph. No injuries were reported.

The train was damaged with the trolley wedged underneath, stranding 135 passengers. It could have been derailed. The Down Main only re-opened at line speed 3.5 hours after the incident causing significant delays and disruption to our passengers.

The trolley had been left on the access point following rail defect weld repairs, and was the only one in use by the team that night.

The Controller of Site Safety (COSS) signed out with the Engineering Supervisor (ES) by telephone. The worksite was then handed back to the PICOP as being 'safe for the passage of trains'.

This is the second occasion in recent weeks that a trolley has been left behind after work and missed by 'clear line verification' arrangements.

## Immediate action required

The investigation is ongoing with learning to be shared later. In the meantime please remember:

- The COSS must request permission to place trolleys on the line from the ES and advise when they are removed.
- The PIC/COSS must tell the ES when their site of work is complete and safe for the passage of trains.
- The ES must check and confirm to the Person in Charge of the Possession (PICOP) that all of their worksite is safe for the passage of trains.

In axle counter areas:

- Process NR/L3/OPS/084 'Line Clear Arrangements following Engineering Works in Axle Counter Area - Line Clear Verification Process' must be followed.
- The ES and COSS must independently record when anything with two or more wheels (such as On Track Plant, trolleys or skates) is put on the line and when it is removed, and confirm this as part of handback.
- The relevant forms must be cross referenced when signing out from the worksite.
- The PICOP must verify with the ES that the relevant forms have been completed and the line is clear.

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# Safety Alert

A serious incident has taken place



## Near miss with two track workers near Kettering


Scope: **All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and accredited contractors**

Ref: NRX21-02

Date: 08/10/2021

Location: East Midlands

Contact: [Daniel Farr](#), Programme Director High Output



Picture: Location of near miss.

## Overview

At 09:58 on 6th October 2021 the driver of a passenger train saw two track workers in the four-foot ahead of their train. The driver sounded the train horn, applied the emergency brake and reported the near miss. He had to be relieved from driving at Kettering station. A Mobile Operations Manager (MOM) attended the site and arranged drugs and alcohol testing.

The track workers had been checking lengths of rail that had been dropped in the location ahead of renewal works, remained in a safe position not affecting running rails. Their safe system of work was 'separated by distance', allowing them to visually check rails from the Down cess. However, overhead line stanchions and an overbridge affected being able to stay the required distance from running lines.

Front facing train video footage indicates that the two track workers had been in the four-foot and reached a position of safety barely five seconds before the train passed. To exit the railway, the two workers crossed four open lines.

## Immediate actions required:

Responsible managers, Safe Work Pack (SWP) planners and line managers should:

- Review all SWPs for forthcoming works where the safe system of work is separation.
- Verify that the planned activities can be safely performed this way at each specific location.
- Identify whether there are safer alternative means of performing tasks, i.e. removing the need for people to go on track.

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# Safety Alert

A serious incident has taken place



## Passenger train strikes outrigger

Scope: **All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and accredited contractors**

Ref: NRX21-10

Date: 07/09/2021

Location: Penistone, Sheffield, South Yorkshire

Contact: [Lewis Robinson](#), Head of Safety & Sustainable Development, Eastern Capital Delivery



### Overview

On the 27th August 2021, a portable toilet unit was being collected by a HIAB lorry mounted crane from Oxspring renewal site between Penistone Station and Oxspring Viaduct.

As part of the activity, the HIAB driver deployed the outriggers in order to lift the toilet unit. At approximately 08:45hrs a passenger train came into contact with the front left outrigger causing superficial damage to the train.

The train came to a stand and the line was blocked. No injuries occurred as a result of the incident.

The incident location was attended by the Principal Contractor management, British Transport Police and Route staff.

The incident is currently under investigation by the Principal Contractor. A safety bulletin will be issued once further learning is identified.

### Discussion Points

- How do you ensure that a site specific lift plan is in place?
- How are appropriate safe systems of work put into place for works where non-rail plant may foul open lines?
- How often are competencies checked for individuals that are not involved in works

What checks are in place to ensure that ad-hoc or routine operations are being planned and managed appropriately?

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# Safety Bulletin

A serious incident has taken place



## Railway crime in yards and depots

Issued to: **All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and accredited contractors**

Ref: NRB21-09

Date of issue: 22/10/2021

Location: Wrenthorpe Sidings, Wakefield Westgate

Contact: Olly Glover, Head of Safety, Health & Environment, North & East route



## Overview

At 14.22hrs on the 10 October 2021 an empty stone wagon ran away and derailed on a set of trap points at Wrenthorpe Sidings, Wakefield Westgate on Network Rail infrastructure.

This incident is currently under investigation by the British Transport Police (BTP) as a malicious act by juveniles who intentionally released handbrakes on a number of wagons, before detaching the wagon which ran away.

Action was immediately taken to review site security arrangements, additional BTP officers were deployed; and a review was undertaken to look at the possibility of permanently isolating the Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) at this location.

There have been other serious incidents, many of which have led to criminal convictions for railway companies including Network Rail, freight operating companies and a terminal operator. Fines have cost the industry many £millions. Some examples are:

- In 2017 an 11 year old boy was killed after coming into contact with overhead line at Daventry Freight Terminal. The site operator was prosecuted and received a record fine of £6.5 million.

- In 2017 two children received burns at Bescot Yard Freight Terminal after climbing on top of a train and coming into contact with overhead line equipment (OLE).
- In 2015 a 16 year old was killed at Wrenthorpe Sidings when he climbed onto a wagon and came into contact with the OLE.
- In 2014 four children gained access to Tyne Yard. Two received injuries after climbing onto a wagon and coming into contact with OLE.
- In 2009 three children entered Allerton rail depot and climbed on stabled wagons. One child was killed whilst his two friends suffered life changing injuries from the live OLE.

Following these incidents and further assessment of the risks work has taken place to reduce the risk of access to these sites through enhanced fencing and removal of redundant buildings that can appeal to trespassers. The risk has also been reduced in many areas through removal of stabled wagons and isolation or removal of OLE equipment where wagons are stabled. However, this incident at Wrenthorpe shows that trespass continues to be a significant threat and that site security needs to be a priority issue.

## Discussion Points

- What process do you have in place to assess trespass risk in depots and yards?
- Are trespass risk assessments revised regularly enough to capture changes?
- How do you check that risk assessment findings have been acted upon?
- Are you using the industry guidance for trespass mitigation? [Click here to view.](#)
- Do you have locations where OLE can be removed or isolated?
- Where you have known trespass hotspots, how do you work with your community safety manager to understand the problems and work with local communities (schools, social clubs etc)?

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## Safety Bulletin



everyone  
home safe  
every day

### Flame cutting or welding in tunnels

Issued to: **All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and accredited contractors**

Ref: NRB21-10

Date of issue: 20/12/2021

Location: Sevenoaks Tunnel, Kent, Southern region

Contact: [John Boyce, Head of Fire Safety, Technical Authority](#)



### Overview

A team of contractors working for Capital Delivery went into Sevenoaks tunnel intending to use oxy-propane cutting equipment to cut some metal work out of one of the ventilation shafts. A welding team from maintenance told the contractor team they could not use propane in the tunnel. The oxy-propane equipment was removed.

The contractors were cutting at a high level in and around the ventilation shaft in the tunnel. The contractor had assessed the risks and identified that a leak or release of acetylene, an alternative fuel gas that is lighter than air, may collect in the vicinity. Application of a flame may then ignite it.

For that reason, the work planning had rejected the use of acetylene and chose propane as a safer alternative for this specific task. Network Rail's company standard for welding the track (i.e. at ground level) only recognises use of acetylene because propane could gather at a low level creating a fire or explosion risk.

An investigation is underway and there is a planned review of fire prevention/precautions in the company standards for cutting and welding in tunnels.

### Discussion Points

- Using any flammable gases in tunnels or ventilation shafts involves increased risk and alternative methods should always be considered.
- All confined space welding or cutting tasks that plan to involve either propane or acetylene must be thoroughly risk assessed in advance.
- Appropriate control measures should be recorded in the risk assessment and used on site.
- The two fuel gases have different properties:
  - Acetylene is lighter than air so any leaks will rise, including up ventilation shafts.
  - Propane is heavier, so any leaks will gather at low level, including possibly in drains.
- Using acetylene involves specific hazards in the event of a fire and requirements for how cylinders must be handled.
- Whichever gas is selected, equipment must be checked to prevent leaks and the amount of cylinders in the confined space kept to a minimum.
- Accurate information about the location and amount of fuel gases should be readily available to the emergency services if an incident does occur.
- Are you aware of the 'work safe' procedure and how to raise one?
- How can you help people feel empowered to stop work if they came across unsafe activity or behaviour?

## Approved POS Providers – Update from Network Rail

### On-Track Plant Operations Scheme Provider Approval Status - 14 December 2021

RISQS Supplier number	POS Provider Name	POS Status	POS Certificate Expiry	Limitations
1907	AB2000 Ltd	Full	17/03/2022	No
1639	Alun Griffiths (Contractors) Ltd	Full	24/01/2022	No
3436	A P Webb Plant Hire Ltd.	Full	23/02/2022	No
2545	Amey Rail Ltd	Full	21/02/2022	No
1763	Avondale Environmental Services Ltd	Full	05/08/2022	Limited to vegetation management operations only
2453	Babcock Rail	Full	25/08/2022	No
1583	Balfour Beatty Rail Ltd.	Full	31/01/2022	No
2082	Bridgeway Consulting Ltd	Full	30/09/2022	Limited to OTP operations at RIDC only
2732	Colas Rail	Full	08/10/2022	No
1803	Coombes Forestry Ltd	Full	29/03/2022	No
5428	Electrification Construction Services Ltd	Full	06/04/2022	Limited to MEWP operations only
3339	Elmec Solutions Ltd	Full	23/01/2022	No
2263	Force One Ltd	Full	29/03/2022	No
1998	J.Murphy & Sons Ltd.	Full	09/01/2022	No
5282	Keltbray Rail	Full	22/06/2022	No
2726	Land Recovery Rail Ltd	Full	07/04/2022	No
3063	L & W Contractors Ltd	Full	14/03/2022	No
3397	Lundy Projects Ltd.	Full	08/12/2022	No

2343	Morgan Sindall PLC	Full	21/11/2022	No
1422	Pod-Trak	Full	11/04/2022	No
4034	Pro Rail Services Ltd	Full	07/02/2022	No
3620	Quantum Construction and Rail Services Ltd	Full	25/12/2022	Limited to Geismar BRM8 Tamper operations only
1681	Quattro Plant Ltd	Full	28/01/2022	No
2352	QTS Group Ltd	Full	08/08/2022	No
4802	Rail Electrification Ltd	Full	19/02/2022	Limited to MEWP operations only
3317	Rail Op OHL Ltd	Full	16/05/2022	Limited to MEWP operations only
2062	Readypower Engineering Ltd	Full	09/06/2022	No
2264	Scottish Woodlands Ltd	Full	25/07/2022	No
3513	Sonic Rail Services Ltd	Full	24/01/2022	No
3751	Specialist Engineering Services Ltd	Full	06/12/2022	No
3844	SPL Powerlines UK Ltd (ex Border Rail)	Full	09/06/2022	No
3875	SRS Rail System Ltd	Full	28/08/2022	Limited to HPV mounted MEWP operations only
7535	Story Plant Ltd	Full	18/02/2022	No
3497	Super Rod Ltd	Full	31/01/2022	Limited to Drainage operations only
5993	Total Rail Solutions	Full	28/03/2022	No
2122	Trackwork Ltd	Full	07/03/2022	No
2381	TRAC Engineering Ltd	Full	12/10/2022	No

5126	TSO Rail Ltd	Full	28/09/2021	Limited to MEWP operations only
3323	TXM PLANT	Full	11/07/2022	No
3841	Van Elle Rail	Full	09/01/2022	No
1756	VolkerRail Specialist Businesses Ltd	Full	31/01/2022	No
3778	W & D McCulloch Ltd	Full	12/10/2022	Limited to highway based OTP vehicles only
2493	XYZ Rail Ltd	Full	30/08/2022	No

# QUIZ TIME

Congratulations to Johnathan Buck of Riverside Auto for correctly answering the question I am 181 years old this year, I am 116miles 31chain from London

What am I?

The Answer was **Bristol Temple Meads Station**

The £25 voucher is on its way to Jonathan

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So, as we wave goodbye to 2021, we have another opportunity to create a winner!

There is a £25 M&S Voucher up for grabs to spend in the New Year Sales if you can correctly answer the question below.



*To be a winner this month, just answer the simple question below;*

*A couple of years ago I visited this station and took this photograph. Where was I??*

Answers by email please to [info@prb-consulting.co.uk](mailto:info@prb-consulting.co.uk) to be in with a chance winning the £25.00 M&S voucher

Closing Date: 30<sup>th</sup> January 2022



of

**RAIL SAFETY BULLETIN DECEMBER 2021**

Briefed By:		Briefers Role:	
Briefing Date:		Briefers Signature:	
Sentinel Coordinator:		Sentinel Coordinator Signature:	

**By signing below, I confirm that I have received and understood the briefing material contained within this bulletin.**

NAME	SENTINEL NUMBER	SIGNATURE