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October 2023

Rail Safety Bulletin



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Contents

LSR / CDM breach – fencing works undertaken without CPP in place – NRL23-04

Overview

Following a site documentation assurance review, carried-out on an existing fencing project adopted by SCO Capital Programmes, it was established that the project was underway without a Construction Phase Plan (CPP) in place. This was a breach of the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (CDM Regs).

It was believed by both the Network Rail (NR) project team and the Contractor's project team that CDM did not apply and, subsequently, a CPP was not required. Adequate Work Package Plans (WPP's) and Task Briefing Sheets (TBS's) were in place for the works but the requirement for a CPP was overlooked.

This led to the raising of a Close Call and subsequent Level 1 Investigation as a Life Saving Rule breach. A CPP was retrospectively requested be compliant with legislation and, in the meantime, a review of WPP's, TBS's and Site Audit Reports took place to ensure works were being carried out safely.

Underlying Cause

A lack of CDM knowledge and awareness within the Network Rail project team, and failure to follow a project lifecycle process meant a CPP was not requested from the Contractor.

The contractor's project team believed CDM did not apply, because Network Rail had not requested a CPP. Focus, therefore, was on the production of WPP's and TBS's for the individual packages of work.

The works commenced without the required CPP in place partially because the project teams did not involve Health & Safety (H&S) support early in the project.

Discussion Points:

- To confirm if CDM applies to your project, check the definition of 'Construction' as per the legislation, section 1.2 – Interpretation - The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (legislation.gov.uk).
- Failure to comply with the CDM regs may incur a penalty from the Office of Rail and Road (ORR).
- If CDM applies to your project, be sure to follow Network Rail's Standards NR/L2/OHS/0047 and NR/L3/INI/0044.
- If your project falls under CDM, you need to have a CPP. This is the responsibility of the Principal Contractor (PC); It is to be drawn up during the pre-construction phase; and in place before setting up a construction site. For single contractor projects, this is the responsibility of the sole contractor.
- Where projects involve any construction work, ensure your project team have adequate CDM knowledge, awareness and training.
- For Network Rail employees, there is a suite of training available to enrol on via Oracle. There are three course options available: CDM Awareness and Client CDM Contractor and Principal Contractor CDM Designer and Principal Designer For more details, see Network Rail's training catalogue.
- The HSE have produced a guidance on CDM, it is referred to as guidance document L153, and is available here. CDM guidance is also available via Safety Central

Near Miss at Penkridge – NRL23-05

Overview/Underlying Causes

On Sunday 10th July 2022, a team of Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) staff were responding to an OLE issue affecting the Down Penkridge Line.

The Person in Charge had agreed a line blockage with the signaller and the team split into 3 groups. Two OLE technicians were instructed to operate an OLE Switch on the Down Penkridge Line, within the limits of the line blockage.

At 23:54, the signaller contacted the Person in Charge to hand back the line blockage to allow a diesel freight train through the area.

At 23:58, the train driver saw two track workers on the line they were travelling on and sounded the warning horn without having time to apply the emergency brake.

Initially it was reported back by the OLE team the technicians were positioned in the cess, however later onboard footage confirmed they jumped clear of the trains path at the last moment.

The two OLE technicians did not have a Safe System of Work (SSoW) when they left the work group to operate the switch.

The Stafford OLE team perceived that the group were under significant pressure to find the fault given their awareness of financial implications should the line remain closed, in addition to the knock-on effect on other planned work and the potential effect on the team's reputation.

Level 1 assurance in relation to reactive faultfinding work was not intrusive and therefore is not sufficient to fully assure the workforce are working in accordance with NR/L2/OHS/019/01.

Discussion Points are noted below.

A full copy of the report is available at the RAIB website: https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/report-09-slash-2023-near-miss-with-two-track-workers-at-penkridge

Discussion Points:

Line Managers: Review how your teams are supported in dealing with pressures of operational railway during fault scenarios.

- Do you have right level of capability, supervision and leadership in your teams?
- What and how often are non-technical skills trained and discussed with your teams

Senior Manager and Line Managers: Discuss how communication impacts safety in; leadership messages, functional cascades and communication during ongoing incident management. Are you unintentionally creating environments where performance, cost and Safety are competing priorities rather than Safety and performance going hand in hand?

Supportive Assurance: Review how robust your L1 assurance activities are in relation to application of 019 principles; in particular use of Incident Response Packs.

Front-line Staff: Life Saving Rules save lives – A valid, implemented safe system of work would have avoided the risk of a fatality in this instance. The person in charge shall not allow the implemented SSoW to be comprised for any reason. Where there are changes in circumstances that affect the SSoW, the person in charge shall make sure everyone in their workgroup moves to a position of safety, and only then shall they reassess and implement appropriate changes in line with the requirements of 019 and the rulebook.
Personal Responsibility: Any incident must always be reported as soon as is safe to do so to Route Control and your management. Compromising the safety of yourself or others is not acceptable, we all have a personal responsibility to ensure incidents are reported.

Pierced Traction Cables – NRB23-07

Overview – Incident 1

On 4th May 2023, EK2033B points at Gillingham pierced a live traction cable that had become caught in the point machine. The incident punctured the insulation of the cable causing a short circuit and damage to the point machine. The short circuit meant that the lock/detection blades became live and could have caused injury to any operator using the manual winding mechanism.

The section of cable which was pierced was due to be replaced as part of planned project work that night. The coiled-up section had been delivered to site for this replacement work. This cable was propped up against the wall and subsequently slipped down, pushing the live cable section towards the point machine. Subsequent operations of the points led to the machine blade ends coming into contact with the cable and ultimately pierce / puncture its insulation layers, exposing the live conductor cable. Following a point movement, the lock / detection blades came into contact with the live conductor causing a short circuit.

Overview – Incident 2

On 19th June 2023, NK2251B points at Gravesend pierced a live traction cable that was near the machine.

During operation of the points, the movement of the lock and detection blades (with threaded ends) punctured the insulation of the cable. 2L31 then passed over the points and this additional pressure created a catastrophic short circuit that destroying the point machine, 4 traction cables, sole plate & stretcher bar insulations as well as track circuit equipment.

It also damaged a train that was stopped over the crossing.

The Route has commenced a specific check on all point machines on the area and already identified two further point ends where action is required to remove the risk.

Discussion Points:

- Are you and your team fully checking for the proximity of traction cables during points maintenance?
- Are you and your team storing and securing materials in a safe way, thinking about how it might move and what might happen if it did?
- Are you compliant to the cable separation standard (NR/L3/ELP/27250/CRE805)? Remember, no traction cable should be within 500mm of a point machine.

Are you and your team:

- Fully checking the proximity of traction cables points machines during CRE inspections?
- Installing additional mechanical cable protection where required e.g., Yellow Split ducting or troughing?
- Re-routing cables where it is identified clearance is insufficient from other assets?

Winch remote controls (Warn Industries) – NRA23-08

Overview

There has been a technical recall from Warn Industries concerning a batch of Winch Remote Controls possibly fitted to GreenMech SAFE and SURE-Trak vegetation machines.

Warn Industries advise that a defect exists in the handheld remote control device that was sold with WARN VR EVO winches. A small number of remotes which have been exposed to, or submerged in water have exhibited failures that can result in unintended winch operation, which may increase the risk of injury.

Note, only the remote is subject to this recall notice, the winch is not affected.

Products affected: Remotes shipped with all WARN VR EVO winch models manufactured between 03 June 2019 and 29 November 2022:

PN 103250 - VR EVO 8 PN 103251 - VR EVO 8-S PN 103252 - VR EVO 10 PN 103253 - VR EVO 10S PN 103254 - VR EVO 12 PN 102355 - VR EVO 12-S PN 104218 - S/P Remote & Control module

Product Identification: **VR EVO Winch Serial numbers Affected:**

03062019xxxx - 29112022xxxx
(03 June 2019 - 29 November 2022)
Serial numbers are located on the back side of the winch drum support.

Immediate Action Required:

1. Inspect the remote for any internal corrosion or signs of water ingress.
2. Open the remote by removing the 3 screws and remove the batteries (1 x Li-ion or 3 x AAA depending on manufacturing date). Removing these batteries disables the wireless function of the remote.
3. If no corrosion is found, the remote can still be used to control the winch but only when physically plugged into the winch control pack.
4. Discard the batteries, you will not reinsert them back into the remote during reassembly.
5. If corrosion is found, the remote can no longer be used and must be replaced.
6. Reassemble the remote using the 3 screws without the batteries.
7. Contact your local WARN Distributor to obtain a refurbished or replacement remote. This may be a wired only remote as an interim solution while you wait to receive a refurbished or replacement wired/wireless remote when available.
8. Keep the remote dry and unplugged when not in use.
9. If you don't find a distributor in your area, contact Warn Industries at cs@warn.com or visit our website www.warn.com/vr-evo-remote-info for more information about getting a replacement remote.

Warn Industries is developing a replacement water-resistant remote control that it will make available to affected customers, at no charge, when the product is available.

Tampering of Automatic Fire Detection System – NRB23-08

Overview

Whilst carrying out an asbestos survey at a Network Rail managed building, a contractor discovered an automatic fire detector that had been tampered with. This is a breach of fire regulations.

The fire detector was located in the ceiling space of the male toilets between two sets of ducting.

A rubber glove was placed over the smoke detector, preventing potential smoke in the event of a fire from activating the audible fire alarm. The incident was reported to senior management with a Close Call being raised. The glove was then removed, when safe to do so, to retain the full working order of the fire system and safety of the occupants.

Discussion Points:

If a smoke detector is covered, it prevents the automatic detection of a potential fire. This could result in a number of increased risks including:

- Preventing fire detection at an early stage and would rely on human intervention.
- Slower than expected evacuation of premises.
- Prevents the indication and location of the fire zone for responsible persons and emergency services.

Further points for discussion:

- Why do you have fire detectors?
- How do you report fire detectors that look to not be working or tampered with?

What do you need to do?

- Any works completed which could affect an automatic fire detection system should have an approved method statement in agreement with the appropriate asset engineer. On completion of works, all contractors must verify and assure all systems are restored to their original status.
- Ensure all automatic fire detectors are checked and inspected on a six-monthly basis by the PRFS and record findings in the Fire Safety Log Book - NR/L3/FIR/109/F008

GreenMech Woodchippers- NRA23-09

Overview

A number of GreenMech Woodchippers, EVO 205D SAFE and SURE-Trak models have left the factory without the Engine Harness Support Bracket being fitted.

GreenMech have now created a new bracket for retrofit, along with a new Over Centre Valve Mount which needs to be fitted in order to accommodate the new bracket and revised wiring loom position.

Owners of any models should carry out an inspection and confirm if retrofit work needs to be undertaken. You can order the part numbers as specified below and claim back the cost under GreenMech.

Warranty procedures. Questions should be directed to the Service Department: support@greenmech.co.uk or 01789 400044 Option 2.

Harness

New position of over centre valve

Bracket



Old position of over centre valve

Immediate Action Required:
1. Inspect EVO 205D SAFE and SURE-Trak models and confirm if retrofit work needs to be undertaken. 2. If work needs to be undertaken, parts should be ordered under: ►Engine Harness Support Bracket – 4038913 ►Track Leg, Over Centre Valve Mount - 4038922 3. Any issues or questions should be directed to Service Department support@greenmech.co.uk or 01789 400044 Option 2

Trackworker Near Miss – NRB23-09

Overview

On the 30th August 2023 a trackworker was less than 5 seconds away from being hit by a passing train.

At 12:22pm, the driver of train 2B93, the Lanark to Glasgow Central service, reported a near miss with a trackworker on the Down Fast West Coast Mainline, which runs adjacent to the Clydesdale lines near Glasgow.

The train was travelling around a curve at approximately 75mph when the driver saw a trackworker in the 4ft and applied the emergency brake.

The trackworker was conducting planned Basic Visual Inspections of the track within the limits of a Line Blockage on the Clydesdale Lines in accordance with the agreed Safe Work Pack (SWP).

After completing their inspections, they stepped out of the agreed line blockage limits and onto the West Coast Main Line, which was open to train movements, and into the path of an oncoming train.

The trackworker managed to step back into a Position of Safety less than 5 seconds prior to the passage of the train on the West Coast Mainline, acknowledging the train warning by raising their arms.

The event is subject to investigation.

Discussion Points:

Please discuss this event with your team and review learning from similar events - Safety Central - Near Miss

What do you do if you identify an infrastructure concern out with your Safe System of Work?

What do you do to ensure that you and your team are clear on the limits of your Safe System of Work?

Always stay within your protection limits.

Never work on an open line.

Always use the safest form of protection when accessing the infrastructure.

Geismar/MAN 18T MEWP Stabiliser Leg Failure – NRA23-12

Overview

In North West and Central, a Geismar 18T MEWP was found to have a stabiliser foot assembly that had become completely detached from the stabiliser leg. The stabiliser legs are used in conjunction with the crane and can also be used to increase the reach of the basket.

Investigations are ongoing, but initial inspections have indicated that a combination of wear and corrosion have led to the single bolt connecting the foot assembly to the stabiliser leg failing.

Immediate Action Required:
• All stabiliser legs and feet assemblies to be thoroughly inspected by a competent person. • Do not use the stabiliser legs on the Geismar 18T MEWPs until the inspection has been completed and any required remedial work has been carried out.

QUIZ TIME

There were quite a few correct entries to the Quiz that was set in June Rail Safety Bulletin.

The Question

Inter7City trains call at Scotland's seven cities. Can you name them all?

Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Inverness, Glasgow, Perth & Stirling

The first name out of the stationmaster's hat was …… Heidi Gibbens of Maylarch Environmental

Congratulations Heidi!!

So, we have another opportunity to create a winner!

There is a £25 M&S Voucher up for grabs in this, the 2023 Rail Safety Bulletin.

To be a winner this month, just answer the simple question below;

The Question

Rearrange the letters to find the famous train stations.

Chemically Discrepant	**Loveliest Report**	**Byway Mess**
Candler Traffic	**Arsenic Transplantation**	**Potbellied Stammers**

Answers by email please to info@prb-consulting.co.uk to be in with a chance of winning the £25.00 M&S voucher.

Closing Date: 31st December 2023

RAIL SAFETY BULLETIN October 2023			
Briefed By:		Briefers Role:	
Briefing Date:		Briefers Signature:	
Sentinel Coordinator:		Sentinel Coordinator Signature:	

By signing below, I confirm that I have received and understood the briefing material contained within this bulletin.

NAME	SENTINEL NUMBER	SIGNATURE	DATE